Method and apparatus for providing broadcast service using encryption key in a communication system

ABSTRACT

A method and apparatus for receiving a broadcast service in a communication system is provided. The method includes receiving a key pair comprising a first key and a second key from a network, generating at least one of encryption keys using the key pair, receiving encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted from the network, and decrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one of encryption keys.

PRIORITY

This application is a continuation of prior application Ser. No.12/418,141, filed on Apr. 3, 2009, which claims the benefit under 35U.S.C. §119(a) of a Korean patent application filed in the KoreanIntellectual Property Office on Apr. 4, 2008 and assigned Serial No.10-2008-0031885, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporatedby reference.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to broadcast services in a communicationsystem. More particularly, the present invention relates to a method andapparatus for offering broadcast services using encryption keys in acommunication system.

2. Description of the Related Art

Recently, communication systems have been developed to offer a varietyof multimedia services to users. Accordingly, broadcast and multicastservices may be used to provide diverse contents to users. The broadcastand multicast services will be referred to herein as “broadcastservices.”

The term “broadcast service” refers to a point-to-multipoint service inwhich one source object transmits multimedia data, such as audio data,image data and/or video data, to a plurality of recipients within itsservice coverage based on a uni-directional bearer service. Thebroadcast service supports a broadcast mode and a multicast mode. In thebroadcast mode, data is broadcasted to all users in the servicecoverage. On the other hand, in the multicast mode, users have tosubscribe to a particular service or service group provided by a ServiceProvider (SP) in order to enjoy multicast services.

In the multicast mode, broadcast service data is encrypted beforetransmission so that it may be delivered only to the users who havesubscribed to the broadcast service. The transmitted encrypted data mustbe decrypted by the users prior its use. Therefore, encryption keys,used by the service provider in encrypting broadcast data, should beshared with the users. A description will now be made of an encryptionkey management for broadcast service data between a service provider andusers in a conventional communication system.

FIG. 1 illustrates an encryption key management in a conventionalbroadcast service system. The encryption key management method occursbetween a network and a terminal in a broadcast service system based onWorldwide Inter-operability for Microwave Access (WiMax), i.e.,Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard802.16. For reference, the encryption key management described inconnection with FIG. 1 can be similarly applied to a 3rd GenerationPartnership Project (3GPP) broadcast system. Before a detaileddescription of the encryption key management is given, factors used forencryption key management will be described below.

A Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) is used to encrypt service content data.The TEK is periodically updated and transmitted to a terminal(s) havinga Group Key (GK) defined below. The terminal receives the TEK and candecrypt data encrypted with a TEK using the received TEK.

The Group Key (GK) is a key shared among terminals that have subscribedto a broadcast service. The GK, commonly created in a network, can beperiodically updated and transmitted to terminals that have subscribedto a particular service group.

A Security Key (SK) is mutually shared by a network and a terminal thathas subscribed to a broadcast service, through a certain settingprocess. The SK is used by the network to encrypt and transmit a GK orthe like.

A detailed description of FIG. 1 will now be made based on factors usedfor encryption key management.

Referring to FIG. 1, a network 120 encrypts a GK and transmits the GK toa terminal 110 in step 101. The GK is encrypted with an SK andtransmitted to each terminal 110 on a point-to-point basis. Theresulting key is indicated by E_(SK)(GK_(y)), where a subscript “y”indicates an order in which the GK is updated when a broadcast servicecall is connected. That is, the resulting the key is y-th updated in anarbitrary call.

In step 103, the network 120 updates a TEK with the GK_(y) and transmitsthe resulting key TEK_(x+1) to the terminal 110 on a point-to-multipointbasis. The network 120 encrypts actual content data using the TEK_(x+1),and the terminal 110 decrypts the encrypted data using the TEK_(x+1).Since the TEK is set shorter than the GK in a lifetime, the TEK is morefrequently updated compared with the GK. In step 105, the TEK isencrypted and updated by a GK_(y) and the resulting key TEK_(x+n) istransmitted to the terminal 110. That is, the TEK undergoes n updateprocesses from the process for the TEK_(x+1) of step 103 through theprocess for the TEK_(x+n) of step 105. Here, the same GK_(y) is used insteps 103 and 105. In step 107, as the lifetime of the GK 109 expires, anew GK is updated and transmitted to the terminal 110 on apoint-to-point basis. As a result, the TEK is encrypted and updated witha newly updated GK_(y+1).

With reference to FIGS. 2 and 3, a description will now be made of aconventional encryption key management in an Open Mobile AllianceBroadCAST (OMA BCAST) system. FIG. 2 illustrates an encryption keymanagement for a registered terminal, and FIG. 3 illustrates anencryption key management for a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal. The“registered terminal” refers to a terminal that subscribes to aparticular broadcast service for a relatively long time, while the “PPVterminal” refers to a terminal that subscribes to a service in units ofa short time, e.g. in units of specific programs. For example, aterminal, which has purchased a one-month coupon for an arbitrarybroadcast service, may correspond to the registered terminal. Aterminal, which has purchased a coupon for a single drama at aparticular date, corresponds to the PPV terminal. A length of thesubscription period is variable.

In the OMA BCAST, a Service Encryption Key (SEK) and a ProgramEncryption Key (PEK) are further used in addition to the keys used inthe WiMax of FIG. 1. The SEK is used to encrypt a particular broadcastservice, and the PEK is used to encrypt a particular program. Forexample, the broadcast service can be provided by a service provider,and the program can be a particular program provided by the serviceprovider.

Encryption key management in a registered terminal will first bedescribed with reference to FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 illustrates an encryption key management in a registered terminalin a conventional OMA BCAST.

Referring to FIG. 2, a network 120 updates an SEK with an SK andtransmits a resulting key SEK_(y) to a registered terminal 210 in step201. In step 203, the network 120 encrypts a PEK_(z) with the updatedSEK_(y), updates a TEK with the encrypted PEK_(z), and transmits theresulting key TEK_(x+1) to the registered terminal 210. The network 120encrypts content data with the updated TEK_(x+1) and transmits theencrypted data. The registered terminal 210 decrypts the transmittedencrypted data using the transmitted updated TEK_(x+1). When a lifetimeof the TEK_(x+1) expires, the network 120 updates the TEK again in step205. Also, when a lifetime of the SEK_(y) 209 expires, the network 120updates a SEK with an SK and transmits the resulting key SEK_(y+1) tothe registered terminal 210 in step 207. The SEK_(y+1) is then used forencryption of the PEK.

With reference to FIG. 3, a description will now be made of anencryption key management in a PPV terminal. FIG. 3 illustrates anencryption key management in a PPV terminal in a conventional OMA BCAST.

Referring to FIG. 3, a network 120 encrypts a PEK_(z) with an SK at anarbitrary time and transmits the encrypted PEK_(z) to a PPV terminal 310in step 301, thereby updating the PEK. In step 303, the network 120updates the TEK. That is, the network 120 encrypts the PEK_(z) with anSEK_(y), encrypts a TEK_(x+1) with the PEK_(z), and transmits theencrypted keys to the PPV terminal 310. Thereafter, during a lifetime ofthe PEK_(z), the network 120 encrypts a TEK with the PEK_(z) to updatethe TEK in sequence. After a lifetime of the PEK_(z) expires, thenetwork 120 updates the next PEK (PEK_(z+1)) in step 305. That is, thenetwork 120 encrypts the PEK_(z+1) with an SK and transmits theencrypted PEK_(z+1) to the PPV terminal 310. Accordingly, a TEK isencrypted with the PEK_(z+1) to update the TEK until a lifetime of thePEK_(z+1) 309 expires. In step 307, an n^(th) TEK (TEK_(x+n)) is updatedwith a PEK_(z+m).

As described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 3, since the network encryptscontent data with a TEK and the terminal decrypts the encrypted datawith the TEK, the network should update a variety of encryption keysseveral times, and transmit the updated TEKs to the terminal. In thiscase, resources consumed between the network and the terminal to updatethe encryption keys may increase.

Therefore, a need exists for a method and apparatus for reducingresources in a network when encryption keys are updated.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

An aspect of the present invention is to address at least theabove-mentioned problems and/or disadvantages and to provide at leastthe advantages described below. Accordingly, an aspect of the presentinvention is to provide a method and apparatus for reducing a number ofresources for creating an encryption key for broadcast service data andtransmitting the encryption key to a terminal in a communication system.

Another aspect of the present invention is to provide a method andapparatus for reducing resources that a network needs to transmit anencryption key for broadcast service data to a terminal in acommunication system.

Still another aspect of the present invention is to provide a method andapparatus in which a terminal receives an encryption key for broadcastservice data from a network to create a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK),and decrypts received encrypted data with the TEK in a communicationsystem.

In accordance with an aspect of the present invention, a method forreceiving a broadcast service by a terminal in a communication system isprovided. The method includes receiving a key pair comprising a firstkey and a second key from a network, generating at least one ofencryption keys using the key pair, receiving encrypted broadcastservice data broadcasted from the network, and decrypting the encryptedbroadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one of encryptionkeys.

In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, a method forreceiving a broadcast service by a terminal in a communication system isprovided. The method includes transmitting a registration messageincluding a registration information of the terminal to a network,receiving a key pair comprising a first key and a second key from thenetwork, generating at least one of forward encryption keys by applyinga forward hash chain to the first key, generating at least one ofreverse encryption keys by applying a reverse hash chain to the secondkey, generating at least one of encryption keys using the at least oneof forward encryption keys and the at least one of reverse encryptionkeys, receiving encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted from thenetwork, and decrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcastedusing the at least one of encryption keys.

In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, an apparatusfor receiving a broadcast service in a terminal for a communicationsystem is provided. The apparatus includes a transceiver for receiving akey pair comprising a first key and a second key from a network, anencryption key generator for generating at least one of encryption keysusing the key pair, and a data decryptor for decrypting the encryptedbroadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one of encryptionkeys.

In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, an apparatusfor receiving a broadcast service in a terminal for a communicationsystem is provided. The apparatus includes a transceiver fortransmitting a registration message including a registration informationof the terminal to a network and for receiving a key pair comprising afirst key and a second key from a network, an encryption key generatorfor generating at least one of forward encryption keys by applying aforward hash chain to the first key, for generating at least one ofreverse encryption keys by applying a reverse hash chain to the secondkey, and for generating at least one of encryption keys using the atleast one of forward encryption keys and the at least one of reverseencryption keys, and a data decryptor for decrypting the encryptedbroadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one of encryptionkeys.

Other aspects, advantages, and salient features of the invention willbecome apparent to those skilled in the art from the following detaileddescription, which, taken in conjunction with the annexed drawings,discloses exemplary embodiments of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The above and other aspects, features and advantages of certainexemplary embodiments of the present invention will be more apparentfrom the following description taken in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates an encryption key management between a network and aterminal in a conventional broadcast service system;

FIG. 2 illustrates an encryption key management in a registered terminalin a conventional Open Mobile Alliance BroadCAST (OMA BCAST);

FIG. 3 illustrates an encryption key management in a Pay-Per-View (PPV)terminal in a conventional OMA BCAST;

FIG. 4 illustrates a creation of encryption keys in a broadcast servicesystem according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 illustrates an encryption key management method by a network in abroadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 6 illustrates an encryption key management method by a terminal ina broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 7 illustrates an exemplary encryption key management applied to aregistered terminal in an OMA BCAST according to an exemplary embodimentof the present invention;

FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary encryption key management applied to aPPV terminal in an OMA BCAST according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 9 illustrates an operation of each entity in an encryption keymanagement for a registered terminal in an OMA BCAST according to anexemplary embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 10 illustrates an operation of each entity in an encryption keymanagement for a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal in an OMA BCAST accordingto an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 11 illustrates encryption key management for a registered terminalin a Worldwide Inter-operability for Microwave Access (WiMax) broadcastservice system according to an exemplary embodiment of the presentinvention;

FIG. 12 illustrates an encryption key management for a PPV terminal in aWiMax broadcast system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 13 illustrates a network apparatus for managing encryption keys ina broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention; and

FIG. 14 illustrates an encryption key management apparatus of a terminalin a broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment ofthe present invention.

Throughout the drawings, the same drawing reference numerals will beunderstood to refer to the same elements, features and structures.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

The following description with reference to the accompanying drawings isprovided to assist in a comprehensive understanding of exemplaryembodiments of the invention as defined by the claims and theirequivalents. It includes various specific details to assist in thatunderstanding but these are to be regarded as merely exemplary.Accordingly, those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize thatvarious changes and modifications of the embodiments described hereincan be made without departing from the scope and spirit of theinvention. In addition, descriptions of well-known functions andconstructions are omitted for clarity and conciseness.

The terms and words used in the following description and claims are notlimited to the bibliographical meanings, but, are merely used by theinventor to enable a clear and consistent understanding of theinvention. Accordingly, it should be apparent to those skilled in theart that the following description of exemplary embodiments of thepresent invention are provided for illustration purpose only and not forthe purpose of limiting the invention as defined by the appended claimsand their equivalents.

It is to be understood that the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the”include plural referents unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.Thus, for example, reference to “a component surface” includes referenceto one or more of such surfaces.

A basic concept of exemplary embodiments of the present invention willbe briefly described. In the exemplary embodiments of the presentinvention, a network providing a broadcast service creates a seed keypair used for creating Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs) and transmits theseed key pair to a terminal. When using the seed key pair, the networkand the terminal each create a certain number n of TEKs, where ncorresponds to a lifetime of the seed key pair. The network encryptsdata with the n TEKs and transmits the data to the terminal the certainnumber n of times. The terminal also decrypts the transmitted encrypteddata with the n TEKs created by the terminal itself.

When transmission/reception of data is completed as all the n TEKs areused, a lifetime of the seed key pair expires and the network creates anext encryption key pair and transmits the encryption key pair to theterminal. However, if the terminal is a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal thathas requested a particular program, the terminal sets a lifetime of theseed key pair according to a broadcast time of the particular program.Therefore, there is no need to update any more seed key pair. Thenetwork may be a base station or a server controlling the base station,or a server of a service provider providing broadcast services in awireless communication system providing broadcast services.

The broadcast service method and apparatus proposed by exemplaryembodiments of the present invention may be applied to broadcastservices in a wireless communication system and also in a wiredcommunication system.

Creation of the TEKs will be described below based on the foregoingbasic concept.

FIG. 4 illustrates a creation of encryption keys in a broadcast servicesystem according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 4, an encryption key pair, called a Key Seed Pair(KSP), is created in step 401. The KSP includes two keys. That is, theKSP includes KS₁ and KS₂. The KSP may be randomly created in a network.

Thereafter, hash chains are applied to the KS₁ and the KS₂ in steps 403and 405, respectively. That is, a forward hash chain is applied to theKS₁ in step 403, and a reverse hash chain is applied to the KS₂ in step405. Steps 403 and 405 may be performed either simultaneously or with atime difference. Even with a time difference, any one of steps 403 and405 may be performed first.

More specifically, in step 403, an S₁ is determined by applying a hashfunction to the KS₁, and an S₂ is found by applying the hash function tothe S₁. Determination for up to an S_(n) is performed in a similarmanner.

The reverse hash chain in step 405 progresses in an opposite directioncompared with the forward hash chain. That is, an M_(n) is first foundby applying a hash function to the KS₂, and an M_(n−1) is determined byapplying the hash function to the M_(n). In this manner, up to an M₁ isdetermined by applying the hash function to the M₂. When steps 403 and405 are completely performed, n (S_(i), M_(i)) pairs may be created,which are defined as a “Bidirectional Hash Pair (BHP)”.

In step 407, n TEKs are found by applying a certain operation to the nBHPs determined in steps 403 and 405. The operation used may be anExclusive OR (XOR) operation. That is, the TEKs may be found with anequation of TEK_(i)=S_(i) XOR M_(i).

In summary, one KSP (KS₁, KS₂) is first created, n BHPs (S_(i), M_(i))are created with the KSP, and n TEKs are created with the n BHPs (S_(i),M_(i)). A process for creating the TEKs may be performed in a networkand/or a terminal.

If the terminal is a registered terminal, the network transmits a KSP,and the network and the terminal determine n TEKs using theabove-described method. Thereafter, the network may encrypt data, andthe terminal may decrypt the encrypted data.

However, if the terminal is a PPV terminal, the network may illustrate aslight difference without using the KSP. That is, the network does notfind a KSP, but finds an Access Valid Pair (AVP). Thereafter, thenetwork transmits the AVP to the PPV terminal. The “AVP” refers to an(S_(i), M_(j)) information pair corresponding to a particular timeperiod for which broadcast service is provided to the PPV terminal. ThePPV terminal finds a value of up to an S_(j) by applying a forward hashchain to the S_(i), and finds a value of up to an M_(i) by applying areverse hash chain to the M_(j). That is, the PPV terminal creates mBHPs from the AVP. If the number of BHPs created in the PPV terminal ism, m=j−i+1. In conclusion, the PPV terminal finds m TEKs using the mBHPs.

In summary, an encryption key pair transmitted from the network to theregistered terminal is KSP=(KS₁, KS₂), and an encryption key pairtransmitted to the PPV terminal is AVP=(S_(i), M_(j)). Although both theKSP and the AVP are different in name, the KSP and the AVP areessentially equal in that they are information related to dataencryption for a time period of a broadcast service provided to theterminal. That is, if information related to data encryption at a starttime of a reference period of the broadcast service is KS₁ andinformation related to data encryption at an end time is KS₂, the S_(i)may indicate information related to data encryption at a start time inan arbitrary time period belonging to the reference period, and M_(j)may indicate information related to data encryption at an end time inthe arbitrary time period.

For example, if a user can purchase a coupon for a broadcast servicemonth by month, a terminal of the user who purchased the one-monthcoupon may be considered as a registered terminal. A KSP, i.e., (KS₁,KS₂), currently transmitted to the registered terminal may indicateinformation related to data encryption at a start time and an end timeof the one month, respectively. If a user purchased a coupon for asingle drama, a terminal of the user becomes a PPV terminal, and an AVP,i.e., (S_(i), M_(j)), transmitted to the PPV terminal at this time mayindicate information related to data encryption at a start time and anend time of the drama, respectively.

In the foregoing description, the KSP information was used in pairs forthe registered terminal. In some cases, however, one of the KSPinformation, i.e., one of KS₁ and KS₂, may be used instead of theinformation pair, for the registered terminal. Since the number ofinformation pieces is not two, there is no need to identify theinformation with subscripts. Therefore, the information may be simplynamed “KS.” The KS may be information related to data encryption at astart time or an end time of a subscription period of the registeredterminal. That is, when it is determined to apply a reverse hash chainto a KS, the KS may indicate information related to data encryption atan end time of a broadcast service. If it is determined to apply aforward hash chain to the KS, the KS may become information related todata encryption at a start time of the broadcast service.

A reverse hash chain may be applied to the KS in the following manner.

A network creates a KS and delivers the KS to a registered terminal. Inthis case, other parameters (e.g., the number of TEKs, a lifetime of theTEK and the like) associated with the KS may also be transmittedtogether.

To create n TEKs, a hash function is applied to the KS in a reversedirection n times. That is, TEKs are created as follows:

TEK _(n)=hash(KS), TEK _(n−1)=hash(TEK _(n)), TEK ₂=hash(TEK ₃) . . . ,TEK ₁=hash(TEK ₂).

Additionally, the KSP or the AVP may be combined with the conventionalSEK or PEK. For example, in an OMA BCAST, the KSP or the AVP may beencrypted by the SEK and PEK, and delivered to the terminal. The TEK maybe created from the KSP or the AVP in the network and the terminal asdescribed above.

Encryption key management methods of an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention by the network and the terminal will be described withreference to FIGS. 5 and 6, respectively.

FIG. 5 illustrates an encryption key management method by a network in abroadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention.

Referring to FIG. 5, a network receives a registration message from aterminal in step 501. The “registration message” refers to a messageincluding terminal registration information that a terminal uses toreceive a service or a program from the network. In step 503, thenetwork determines if the terminal is a registered terminal or a PPVterminal, based on the registration message.

Determining if the terminal is a registered terminal or a PPV terminalmay be performed in various manners. For example, a registration messagetransmitted from a terminal to the network may include a separateidentifier indicating whether the terminal is a registered terminal or aPPV terminal, or the network may be allowed by an authentication server(not illustrated) connected to the network to inquire if the terminal isa registered terminal or a PPV terminal.

The network proceeds to step 505 if the terminal is a registeredterminal, and proceeds to step 507 if the terminal is a PPV terminal. Instep 505, the network updates (i.e., creates and transmits) a KSP to theterminal

In step 507, the network updates an AVP. That is, in step 507, thenetwork creates an AVP and transmits the AVP to the PPV terminal.Thereafter, in step 509, the network creates TEKs by applying forwardand reverse hash chains to the KSP or the AVP. The network will create nTEKs using the KSP if the terminal is a registered terminal, and createm TEKs using the AVP if the terminal is a PPV terminal. In step 511, thenetwork encrypts data using the TEKs and transmits the encrypted data tothe terminal. In step 513, the network determines if the TEKs arecreated using the KSP or the AVP, and experiences different processesaccording to the result. That is, if the current TEK was created usingthe KSP, the network determines in step 515 whether a lifetime of theKSP has expired. If the lifetime of the KSP has expired, the networkreturns to step 505 and updates the next KSP. If the lifetime of the KSPhas not expired, the network returns to step 511 where it encrypts datausing the next TEK and transmits the encrypted data. However, if thecurrent TEK was created using the AVP, the network determines in step517 whether a lifetime of the AVP has expired. If the lifetime of theAVP has not expired, the network returns to step 511 where it encryptsdata using the next TEK and transmits the encrypted data. However, ifthe lifetime of the AVP has expired, the network ends all processessince there is no need to update the AVP any longer.

FIG. 6 illustrates an encryption key management method by a terminal ina broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention.

Referring to FIG. 6, a terminal transmits a registration message to anetwork in step 601 and receives an updated KSP or AVP from the networkin step 603. That is, the terminal receives the KSP if it is aregistered terminal and receives the AVP if it is a PPV terminal. Instep 605, the terminal creates a TEK using the KSP or the AVP. In step607, the terminal receives encrypted data from the network. In step 609,the terminal decrypts the encrypted data using the TEK. The followingoperation varies according to whether the TEK was created using the KSPor the AVP.

If the TEK was created using the KSP, in other words, if the terminal isa registered terminal, the terminal proceeds to step 613. If it isdetermined in step 613 that a lifetime of the KSP has expired, theterminal returns to step 603 and receives an updated KSP. However, ifthe lifetime of the KSP has not expired, the terminal returns to step609 and decrypts the encrypted data with the next TEK created using thecurrent KSP.

However, if the TEK was created with the AVP in step 611, in otherwords, if the terminal is a PPV terminal, the terminal proceeds to step615. If a lifetime of the AVP has not expired in step 615, the terminalreturns to step 609 and decrypts the encrypted data with the TEKcontinuously. However, if the lifetime of the AVP has expired, theterminal terminates without performing any operation since it hasdecrypted all received encrypted data.

With reference to FIGS. 7 to 12, a description will now be made in whichexemplary embodiments of the present invention described in connectionwith FIGS. 4 to 6 are applied to different broadcast systems. FIGS. 7 to10 illustrate possible examples of a registered terminal and a PPVterminal in an OMA BCAST, and FIGS. 11 and 12 illustrate examplesapplicable to a registered terminal and a PPV terminal in a WorldwideInter-operability for Microwave Access (WiMax) broadcast service system.

FIG. 7 illustrates an exemplary encryption key management applied to aregistered terminal in an OMA BCAST according to an exemplary embodimentof the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 7, a network 720 updates a KSP (KSP_(y)) for anarbitrary call in step 701. That is, the network 720 encrypts a KS₁ anda KS₂ with a Security Key (SK) and transmits the KS₁ and KS₂ to aregistered terminal 710. The network 720 creates n BHPs with the KSP,creates n TEKs from the BHPs, encrypts data using the n TEKs, andtransmits the encrypted data to the registered terminal 710.

The registered terminal 710 creates TEKs with the KSP in the same manneras the network 720, and decrypts the encrypted data received from thenetwork 720. If data transmission/reception is completed as all of nTEKs are used, a lifetime of the KSP_(y) expires 705. Therefore, thenetwork 720 updates the next KSP KSP_(y+1) in step 703.

FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary encryption key management applied to aPPV terminal in an OMA BCAST according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention.

Referring to FIG. 8, if a PPV terminal 810 has purchased a broadcastservice available for a specific access period, a network 820 updates(i.e., creates and transmits) an AVP to the PPV terminal 810 in step801. That is, the network 820 encrypts a (S_(i), M_(j)) pair using an SKand transmits the result to the PPV terminal 810.

The following operation of the PPV terminal 810 is similar to the PPVterminal described above. That is, the PPV terminal 810 applies forwardand reverse hash chains to the received (S_(i), M_(j)) pair. Then,values of S={S_(i), S_(i+1), S_(i+2), . . . S_(j−1), S_(j)} andM={M_(j−1), M_(j−2), . . . , M_(i+1), M_(i)} are determined. Thereafter,the PPV terminal 810 may find m TEKs of TEK_(i)˜TEK_(j) by performing anXOR operation on the determined values. In this case, m=j−i+1. That is,the value of m may be determined from the (S_(i), M_(j)). Here, alifetime of (S_(i), M_(j))=m×(lifetime of TEK), and m is less than orequal to n (m≦n), because n indicates the number of TEKs, whichcorresponds to a lifetime of the KSP, and m indicates the number ofTEKs, which corresponds to a lifetime of the AVP 805.

If an access period 802 has expired and a user has purchased a broadcastservice available for an additional access period, the network 820updates a new AVP and transmits the AVP to the PPV terminal 810 in step803. The PPV terminal 810 may receive the broadcast service for a newaccess period in step 804.

FIG. 9 illustrates an operation of each entity in an encryption keymanagement for a registered terminal in an OMA BCAST according to anexemplary embodiment of the present invention.

The description of FIG. 7 has been given with two entities, such as aregistered terminal and a network. However, the network may consist of aplurality of entities in an OMA BCAST. FIG. 9 illustrates a call flowbetween a terminal and the entities constituting the network.

The entities of the OMA BCAST system will first be described, which maybe applied to FIGS. 9 and 10 in common. A Service Protection-Managementunit (SP-M) 930 (or 1030) has a function of registering and managingterminals. A Service Protection-Key Distribution unit (SP-KD) 940 (or1040) creates a KSP or an AVP and delivers the KSP or the AVP toterminals. In addition, a Service Provider-Encryption unit (SP-E) 950(or 1050) has a function of creating a TEK(s) using the KSP or AVPprovided from the SP-KD 940 (or 1040), encrypting data with the TEK anddirectly transmitting the encrypted data to terminals.

Referring to FIG. 9, a registered terminal 960 transmits a registrationmessage to the SP-M 930 in step 901. The registration message includes aservice ID (for example, 001) of a broadcast service the registeredterminal 960 desires to receive. In step 903, the SP-M 930 establishesan SK with the registered terminal 960. That is, the SP-M 930establishes the same SK as that of the registered terminal 960 byexchanging necessary information in order to share the SK with theregistered terminal 960. In step 905, the SP-M 930 delivers the SK tothe SP-KD 940. In step 907, the SP-KD 940 updates a KSP for theregistered terminal 960 by creating and delivering the first KSP (KSP₁)to the registered terminal 960. In step 909, the SP-KD 940 delivers theKSP₁ to the SP-E 950. The SP-E 950 creates n TEKs using the KSP₁,encrypts broadcast data with one (indicated by TEK_(x)) of the created nTEKs, and transmits the encrypted data to the registered terminal 960 instep 911. In step 913, data encrypted with the created n^(th) TEK istransmitted to the registered terminal 960. Since all of the created nTEKs have been used in step 913, a lifetime of the KSP₁ has expired.Therefore, the SP-KD 940 updates (i.e., creates and transmits) thesecond KSP (KSP₂) to the registered terminal 960 in step 915. Thesucceeding process is equal to the process after the KSP₁ is updated.

FIG. 10 illustrates an operation of each entity in an encryption keymanagement for a PPV terminal in an OMA BCAST according to an exemplaryembodiment of the present invention.

A description of FIG. 10 will be given by focusing on the differencefrom FIG. 9. In the example of FIG. 10, the terminal is a PPV terminal1060. Therefore, a registration message that the PPV terminal 1060transmits in step 1001, includes a program ID (for example, 002), whichdenotes that the PPV terminal 1060 requires a particular broadcastprogram. In step 1007, the SP-KD 1040 updates an AVP₁ and transmits theAVP₁ to the PPV terminal 1060. In step 1013, the SP-E 1050 encrypts datausing an m^(th) TEK (TEK_(x+m)) and transmits the encrypted data to thePPV terminal 1060. After expiration of a lifetime of the AVP₁, the nextAVP₂ is not updated automatically. Instead, the AVP₂ is updated when auser additionally requests a broadcast service for a specific timeperiod. Other operations (i.e., SK Establishment 1003, SK Delivery 1005,AVP₁ Delivery 1009, and transmitting the encrypted data 1011) of FIG. 10are similar to the operations (i.e., SK Establishment 903, SK Delivery905, KSP₁ Delivery 909, and transmitting the encrypted data 1011) inFIG. 9.

FIG. 11 illustrates an encryption key management for a registeredterminal in a WiMax broadcast service system according to an exemplaryembodiment of the present invention. In the WiMax broadcast servicesystem, encryption keys are managed not by a plurality of entities as inthe OMA BCAST, but by one Multicast and Broadcast Service (MCBCS)server.

Referring to FIG. 11, when a registered terminal 1120 progresses with aprocedure for subscribing to a broadcast service provided from an MCBCSserver 1130 in step 1101, the MCBCS server 1130 updates the first KSP(KSP₁) and transmits the KSP₁ to the registered terminal 1120 in step1103. At the same time, the MCBCS server 1130 and the registeredterminal 1120 each create n TEKs. In step 1105, the MCBCS server 1130encrypts data using the created n TEKs and transmits the encrypted datato the registered terminal 1120. When a lifetime of the KSP₁ expires asall of the n TEKs are used, the MCBCS server 1130 updates the second KSP(KSP₂) and transmits the KSP₂ to the registered terminal 1120 in step1107. At the same time, the MCBCS server 1130 and the registeredterminal 1120 each create n TEKs using the KSP₂. In step 1109, dataencrypted with the created n TEKs is transmitted to the registeredterminal 1120.

FIG. 12 illustrates an encryption key management for a PPV terminal in aWiMax broadcast system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention.

A description of FIG. 12 will be given by focusing on the differencefrom FIG. 11. In step 1201, a PPV terminal 1220 purchases access timefor which it will access an MCBCS server 1230 to receive a broadcastservice for a particular time period. In step 1203, an AVP₁corresponding to the particular time period is updated. In addition, theMCBCS server 1230 and the PPV terminal 1220 each create a TEK using theAVP₁. In step 1205, data encrypted by the TEK created with the AVP₁ istransmitted from the MCBCS server 1230 to the PPV terminal 1220. Here,an AVP₂ is not updated automatically upon expiration of a lifetime ofthe AVP₁. That is, when the PPV terminal 1220 purchases more access timefor a particular broadcast service in step 1207, the MCBCS server 1230creates and transmits the AVP₂ to the PPV terminal 1220 in step 1209.Another operation (i.e., the data encrypted with the created n TEKs istransmitted to the registered terminal 1211) of FIG. 12 is similar tothe operation (i.e., data encrypted with the created n TEKs istransmitted to the registered terminal 1120) in FIG. 11.

FIG. 13 illustrates a network apparatus for managing encryption keys ina broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment of thepresent invention.

A transceiver 1301 receives a registration message includingregistration information of a terminal from the terminal, and providesthe registration message to a controller 1303. The controller 1303determines whether the terminal is a registered terminal or a PPVterminal based on the registration information included in the receivedregistration message, and controls a seed key creator 1306 in anencryption key manager 1305 according to the determination result.

The encryption key manager 1305, under the control of the controller1303, creates a seed key appropriate for the type of terminal andcreates an encryption key, i.e., a TEK, using the created seed key. Morespecifically, the encryption key manager 1305 includes the seed keycreator 1306 and an encryption key creator 1307. The seed key creator1306 creates a seed key appropriate for the type of terminal. That is,the seed key creator 1306 creates a KSP if the terminal is a registeredterminal and creates an AVP if the terminal is a PPV terminal. Thecreated KSP or AVP is provided to the transceiver 1301 and theencryption key creator 1307. The KSP or AVP provided to the transceiver1301 is transmitted to the terminal, undergoing update. The terminalcreates TEKs using the updated KSP or AVP.

Meanwhile, the encryption key creator 1307, which has received the KSPor the AVP, creates as many TEKs as the number corresponding to alifetime of the KSP or the AVP. That is, the encryption key creator 1307will create n TEKs using the KSP when the terminal is a registeredterminal, and create m TEKs using the AVP when the terminal is a PPVterminal. In creating TEKs from the KSP or the AVP, forward and reversehash chains may be used as described in connection with FIG. 4.

The TEKs are provided from the encryption key creator 1307 to a dataencryptor 1309, and the data encryptor 1309 encrypts data with the TEKsand transmits the encrypted data to the terminal through the transceiver1301.

FIG. 14 illustrates an encryption key management apparatus of a terminalin a broadcast service system according to an exemplary embodiment ofthe present invention.

A controller 1403 creates a registration message including registrationinformation of the terminal, and transmits the registration message to anetwork through a transceiver 1401. Further, the controller 1403receives a seed key, i.e., a KSP or an AVP, from the network through thetransceiver 1401 in response to the registration message, and providesthe KSP or the AVP to an encryption key creator 1405. The encryption keycreator 1405 updates the provided KSP or AVP, creates as many TEKs asthe number corresponding to a lifetime of the updated KSP or AVP, andprovides the TEKs to a data decryptor 1407.

Meanwhile, upon receipt of encrypted data from the network, thetransceiver 1401 forwards the received encrypted data to the datadecryptor 1407. The data decryptor 1407 decrypts the encrypted datausing the TEKs provided from the encryption key creator 1405. Anoperation after the data decryption does not apply to exemplaryembodiments of the present invention.

As is apparent from the foregoing description, a network may create andtransmit certain encryption keys to a terminal a certain time, insteadof creating and transmitting a variety of encryption keys to a terminalevery time the network transmits broadcast service data to the terminal.Thereby, complexity of the network is reduced. In this manner, thenumber of creating and transmitting encryption keys to the terminal isreduced, allowing efficient use of communication resources. Further, theterminal may create TEKs by itself by receiving an encryption key acertain time, and decrypt received encrypted data using the createdTEKs, contributing to an increase in structural efficiency of theterminal.

Exemplary embodiments of the present invention can also be embodied ascomputer-readable codes on a computer-readable recording medium. Thecomputer-readable recording medium is any data storage device that canstore data which can thereafter be read by a computer system. Examplesof the computer-readable recording medium include, but are not limitedto, read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), CD-ROMs,magnetic tapes, floppy disks, optical data storage devices, and carrierwaves (such as data transmission through the Internet via wired orwireless transmission paths). The computer-readable recording medium canalso be distributed over network-coupled computer systems so that thecomputer-readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion.Also, function programs, codes, and code segments for accomplishing thepresent invention can be easily construed as within the scope of theinvention by programmers skilled in the art to which the presentinvention pertains.

While the invention has been shown and described with reference tocertain exemplary embodiments thereof, it will be understood by thoseskilled in the art that various changes in form and details may be madetherein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention asdefined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for receiving a broadcast service by aterminal in a communication system, the method comprising: receiving akey pair comprising a first key and a second key from a network;generating at least one of encryption keys using the key pair; receivingencrypted broadcast service data broadcasted from the network; anddecrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the atleast one of encryption keys.
 2. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising transmitting a registration message including a registrationinformation of the terminal to the network.
 3. The method of claim 1,wherein the receiving the key pair comprises receiving a Key Seed Pair(KSP), when the terminal is registered terminal.
 4. The method of claim1, wherein the receiving the key pair comprises receiving a Access ValidPair (AVP), when the terminal is Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal.
 5. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the generating the at least one of encryptionkeys comprises: generating at least one of forward encryption keys byapplying a forward hash chain to the first key; generating at least oneof reverse encryption keys by applying a reverse hash chain to thesecond key; and generating the at least one of encryption keys using theat least one of forward encryption keys and the at least one of reverseencryption keys.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the generating the atleast one of encryption keys comprises performing an Exclusive OR on theat least one of forward encryption keys and the at least one of reverseencryption keys.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the decrypting theencrypted broadcast service data broadcasted comprises decrypting theencrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one ofencryption keys for a lifetime of the at least one of encryption keys.8. The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving a next key pair,when the terminal is a registered terminal and a lifetime of the keypair has expired.
 9. The method of claim 1, further comprising when theterminal is a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal and the lifetime of the keypair has expired, transmitting a request for an additional broadcastservice and receiving a next key pair in response thereto if theterminal requires the additional broadcast service.
 10. A method forreceiving a broadcast service by a terminal in a communication system,the method comprising: transmitting a registration message including aregistration information of the terminal to a network; receiving a keypair comprising a first key and a second key from the network;generating at least one of forward encryption keys by applying a forwardhash chain to the first key; generating at least one of reverseencryption keys by applying a reverse hash chain to the second key;generating at least one of encryption keys using the at least one offorward encryption keys and the at least one of reverse encryption keys;receiving encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted from the network;and decrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted usingthe at least one of encryption keys.
 11. The method of claim 10, whereinthe generating the at least one of encryption keys comprises performingan Exclusive OR on the at least one of forward encryption keys and theat least one of reverse encryption keys.
 12. The method of claim 10,wherein the decrypting the encrypted broadcast service data comprisesdecrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the atleast one of encryption keys for a lifetime of the at least one ofencryption keys.
 13. The method of claim 10, further comprisingreceiving a next key pair, when the terminal is a registered terminaland a lifetime of the key pair has expired.
 14. The method of claim 10,further comprising when the terminal is a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminaland the lifetime of the key pair has expired, transmitting a request foran additional broadcast service and receiving a next key pair inresponse thereto if the terminal requires the additional broadcastservice.
 15. An apparatus for receiving a broadcast service in aterminal for a communication system, the apparatus comprising: atransceiver for receiving a key pair comprising a first key and a secondkey from a network; an encryption key generator for generating at leastone of encryption keys using the key pair; and a data decryptor fordecrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the atleast one of encryption keys.
 16. The apparatus of claim 15, furthercomprising a controller for transmitting a registration messageincluding a registration information of the terminal to the network. 17.The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the transceiver receives a Key SeedPair (KSP), when the terminal is registered terminal.
 18. The apparatusof claim 15, wherein the transceiver receives Access Valid Pair (AVP),when the terminal is Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal.
 19. The apparatus ofclaim 15, wherein the encryption key generator generates at least one offorward encryption keys by applying a forward hash chain to the firstkey, generates at least one of reverse encryption keys by applying areverse hash chain to the second key and generates the at least one ofencryption keys using the at least one of forward encryption keys andthe at least one of reverse encryption keys.
 20. The apparatus of claim19, wherein the encryption key generator generates the at least one ofencryption keys by performing an Exclusive OR on the at least one offorward encryption keys and the at least one of reverse encryption keys.21. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the data decryptor decrypts theencrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the at least one ofencryption keys for lifetime of the at least one of encryption keys. 22.The apparatus of claim 15, further comprising a controller for receivinga next key pair through the transceiver, when the terminal is aregistered terminal and the lifetime of the key pair has expired. 23.The apparatus of claim 15, further comprising a controller for, when theterminal is a Pay-Per-View (PPV) terminal and the lifetime of the keypair has expired, transmitting a request for an additional broadcastservice through the transceiver and receiving a next key pair throughthe transceiver in response to the request if the terminal requires theadditional broadcast service.
 24. An apparatus for receiving a broadcastservice in a terminal for a communication system, the apparatuscomprising: a transceiver for transmitting a registration messageincluding a registration information of the terminal to a network andfor receiving a key pair comprising a first key and a second key from anetwork; an encryption key generator for generating at least one offorward encryption keys by applying a forward hash chain to the firstkey, for generating at least one of reverse encryption keys by applyinga reverse hash chain to the second key, and for generating at least oneof encryption keys using the at least one of forward encryption keys andthe at least one of reverse encryption keys; and a data decryptor fordecrypting the encrypted broadcast service data broadcasted using the atleast one of encryption keys.
 25. The apparatus of claim 24, wherein theencryption key generator generates the at least one of encryption keysby performing an Exclusive OR on the at least one of forward encryptionkeys and the at least one of reverse encryption keys.
 26. The apparatusof claim 24, wherein the data decryptor decrypts the encrypted broadcastservice data broadcasted using the at least one of encryption keys forlifetime of the at least one of encryption keys.
 27. The apparatus ofclaim 24, further comprising a controller for receiving a next key pairthrough the transceiver, when the terminal is a registered terminal andthe lifetime of the key pair has expired.
 28. The apparatus of claim 24,further comprising a controller for, when the terminal is a Pay-Per-View(PPV) terminal and the lifetime of the key pair has expired,transmitting a request for an additional broadcast service through thetransceiver and receiving a next key pair through the transceiver inresponse to the request if the terminal requires the additionalbroadcast service.